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FINDING INTENT IN SCHOOL SEGREGATION
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
Recent Supreme Court decisions have established that only intentional
discriminationviolates the equalprotection clauseof the fourteenth amendment,
but the appropriatestandardto be employed in finding the requisite intent is still
not clear. The authordemonstratesthat in school desegregation cases the lower
courts have applieda variety of subjective and objective tests and concludes that
because of uncertainty over the properstandardto apply, the lower courts, in
order to avoid reversal, may apply a more rigorousstandardthan the Supreme
Court would actually require. As a consequence, they may deny minority school
children the full measure of protectionafforded by the equal protection clause.

I.

INTRODUCTION

IN THE LATTER HALF of 1976 and early 1977, the Supreme Court
decided four cases that have an impact on school segregation litigation. The issue tying these four cases together is to what extent must
segregative intent be shown in order to establish an equal protection
violation involving racial discrimination by the state? Washington v.
Davis, I an employment discrimination case, held that disproportionate
racial impact alone is not sufficient to prove unconstitutional discrimination. Austin Independent School District v. United States,2 a school
case in which the court of appeals had found unconstitutional segregation, 3 was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Davis. In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. ,4 where blacks were disproportionately affected by a refusal to rezone for low income housing, the
Supreme Court did not find the intent required to establish a constitutional violation. Dealing with state segregative action in both housing
and schools, the Supreme Court in Metropolitan School District v.
Buckley, 5 vacated the court of appeals finding of a constitutional
violation. The case was remanded for reconsideration in light of
Arlington Heights and Davis.
1. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
2. 429 U.S. 990 (1977).
3. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1976).
4. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).

5. 429 U.S. 1068 (1977).
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In these cases, the Court has said that a finding of segregative
intent is required. This is surprising because "intent" is a concept that
courts have tended to avoid or to objectify in civil cases. Where the
purpose of a suit is to correct the denial of a constitutional right rather
than to punish the one who caused the denial, the emphasis has been on
finding a violation without dealing with the subjective intent of the
actors. 6 The four cases here analyzed deal with the requirement of
segregative intent as an element of a constitutional violation. Until
these cases were decided it was unclear that such a constitutional
requirement existed.
The Supreme Court has not explained what is required to find
segregative or discriminatory intent. Must a specific purpose to discriminate be found? Or, is it possible to infer that the state intended the
natural, foreseeable consequences of its actions? Who has the burden
to prove the state's intent in the situations being litigated? This Note
takes the position that the Supreme Court, in a pair of earlier decisions, 7 gave at least implicit approval to the method of inferring intent
which had been employed by the lower courts. 8 Recent Supreme Court
decisions, however, may cause the lower courts to find constitutional
violations only when the level of discriminatory intent is greater than
that actually required by the Constitution. The focus throughout this
analysis will be solely on discriminatory intent, as an essential element
of an equal protection violation, in the context of public school segregation. This Note is intended to clarify various aspects of the intent
requirement as it has been highlighted by the Supreme Court's recent
pronouncements. The vehicle for this analysis is public school litigation because the case law is sufficiently developed to provide a complete picture of this area of the law without resort to other fact patterns.
In addition, the school situation is sufficiently unique that use of law
developed in other racial discrimination contexts is of limited assistance to an understanding of school segregation law.
To put these issues in better perspective, this Note will consider
first the historical background of school segregation litigation against
which the recent decisions were made. It will then analyze in some
depth the parameters of intent spelled out by the four cases. Questions
unanswered by these cases will be considered in light of various lower
6. Hart v. Community School Bd., 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1976) ("The Fourteenth
Amendment is not meant to assess blame but to prevent injustice."); Reed v. Rhodes,
422 F. Supp. 708, 712-13 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
7. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S.
189 (1973).
8. Milliken v. Bradley, 338 F. Supp. 582, 587 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, 303 F. Supp. 279, 286 (D.C. Colo. 1969).
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court decisions relating to segregative intent. From this discussion,
some conclusions will be drawn as to the effect of the four decisions on
school segregation litigation.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND: EVOLUTION OF THE REQUIREMENT OF INTENT

Schools with State MandatedSegregation:Emphasis on Remedy

1.

The Basic Law
The landmark case finding violation of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment in public schools was Brown v. Board of
Education.9 The Supreme Court held that "segregation [in public
education] is a denial of the equal protection of the laws."l 0 Prior to
this, Plessy v. Ferguson"I and its "separate but equal" doctrine had
constitutionalized states' operation of segregated school systems and
other facilities.
The context of the Brown holding is important to an understanding
of the subsequent development of school segregation law. The unanimous decision was rendered in response to four appeals from four
different states, each of which either explicitly permitted or required
public school segregation by race.' 2 All the plaintiffs were black
students in schools which were required by state agencies to be segregated by race. The Supreme Court ruled that "[s]eparate educational
facilities are inherently unequal ' 13 and, if unequal, in violation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court then
easily found, from the facts, a condition offensive to the Constitution:
absolute segregation by race and segregation that was explicitly required by the state.
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

10. Id.at 495.
11. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
12. The four cases were: (1) Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan.
1961) (Topeka, Kansas), where segregation was permitted, but not required, by state
statute and the Topeka school board had chosen to establish segregated elementary
schools; (2) Briggs v. Elliott, 103 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.S.C. 1952) (Clarendon County,
S.C.), where racial segregation in public schools was required by state statute and

constitution; (3) Davis v. County School Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952) (Prince
Edward County, Va.), where state statute and constitution required segregated public
schools; (4) Gebhart v. Belton, 33 Del. Ch. 144, 91 A.2d 137 (1952) (New Castle County,
Del.), where blacks and whites were required by state statute and constitution to be

segregated in public schools.
13. 347 U.S. at 495.
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The only question remaining was what relief should be granted.
Brown 1114 dealt with this issue, and gave guidelines to establish an
equitable remedy for the constitutional wrong. Formulating the appropriate remedy has continued to occupy the greatest proportion of the
federal courts' time in public school segregation suits. 15 Nevertheless,
it is axiomatic that courts do not shape remedies for constitutional or
any other violations, until a violation is established. In fact "[a]s with
any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the
remedy."' 6 Thus, the finding of the violation is a prerequisite to any
remedy.
The Brown decision, and decisions about schools where segregation had been state mandated, did little to define the elements of an
equal protection violation. Segregation was present and it was imposed
by the state. No mention was made of intent to discriminate or whether
that was a necessary part of the violation. Dealing with school systems
where schools were statutorily segregated, the intent to discriminate by
race was too obvious to require comment. Therefore, cases that the
Supreme Court considered throughout the 1950's and 1960's tended to
deal primarily with what was necessary to correct the violation of the
plaintiff's rights; 8 the finding of the violation was not questioned.
2.

More Recent Cases

Recent cases, dealing with school systems that had had statutory
segregation at the time of Brown but no longer had a written policy
requiring racial segregation, began to speak of intent. In a trio of cases
decided in the early 1970's, the Supreme Court purported not to base
its decisions on the degree of discriminatory intent present; yet in
dictum and in dissenting and concurring opinions, Chief Justice Burger
19
frequently discussed the purpose and motivation of the defendants.
The decision in Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education20 related to the adequacy of the desegregation plan, but a question
14. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
15. E.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
16. 402 U.S. at 16.
17. E.g., Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968); Griffin v. Prince
Edward Island School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
18. E.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Monroe v. Board of
Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968);Griffin v. Prince Edward Island School Bd., 377 U.S. 218

(1964).
19. United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972); Wright v.
Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
20. 402 U.S. at 16 (Burger, C.J.).
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of the extent of the constitutional harm arose. The defendant was the
school system covering the metropolitan area of Charlotte, North
Carolina; the population was substantially segregated by residence,
and the schools within the system were statutorily segregated in 1954
(when Brown was decided). But at the time the case arose there was no
longer a written requirement of segregation. Nevertheless, the presumption was that the obvious segregation in the schools was a result
of the previous segregation requirement. 2 1 Evaluating the adequacy of
the desegregation remedy, the Court's emphasis was on the elimination of the "continuing effects of past school segregation .... ",22 The
burden was on the school authorities to show that the racial composition of the schools was not the result of discriminatory actions.
The Court did not say whether state action that had the effect of
discriminating established intent to discriminate. The illegal state action was the statutory segregation, and the segregative intent was
obvious in the law requiring segregation in the schools. Therefore, the
school system had a duty to "eliminate from the public schools all
23
vestiges of state-imposed segregation."
However, in the majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger went on to
elaborate the duties of the school board, beyond its responsibility for
the present plan. Once the school system had become unitary, that is,
desegregation had been accomplished and racial discrimination
through official action had been eliminated, additional adjustments of
racial composition were not required.
[I]n the absence of a showing that either the school authorities
or some other agency of the State has deliberately attempted
to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial composition of the schools, further intervention by a district court
should not be necessary. 24
This statement appears to indicate that violations of equal protection
guarantees require an intent to effect the wrong-that a violation will
not be found in the future unless the racial composition of the schools
becomes segregated as a result of the state's deliberate and intentional
2
actions. 5
21.

Id. at 26, 28.
22. Id. at 28.
23. Id. at 15.

24. Id.at 32 (emphasis added).
25. The decision in Swann has been the subject of conflicting interpretations. In a
separate opinion in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), Justice Powell
argued that the progression from Brown I through Swann logically required that the de
jure/de facto distinction and the intent requirement be eliminated. "In imposing on
metropolitan southern school districts an affirmative duty, entailing large-scale transpor-
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Since this conclusion did not relate to the remedial plan on which
the Court based its decision, it may be regarded as dictum. Nevertheless, the statement was prophetic of what might follow. The Court has
since held that, once a system is in compliance with the constitutional
mandate, the school authorities need not continue to make adjustments
for racial factors not caused by the school.26
In the next year, Chief Justice Burger again raised the issue of
motivation, this time more directly. 27 Wright v. Council of The City of
29
Emporia28 and United States v. Scotland Neck Board of Education
were companion cases from Virginia and North Carolina. The school
systems were required to desegregate as a result of constitutional
violations. In both cases the Court held that part of a county-wide
school system could not remove itself, and establish its own separate
school system, when it would impede the effectiveness of the desegregation plans. Chief Justice Burger concurred in Scotland Neck and
dissented in Wright, partially because of the difference in motivation
30
of the school authorities in the two fact situations.
The Chief Justice gave three basic reasons for his divergence from
the majority. The first involved the degree to which the separation of
the schools from the county-wide system was "the fulfillment of its
destiny as an independent governmental entity.''31 A second factor
tation of pupils, to eliminate segregation in the schools, the Court required these districts
to alleviate conditions which in large part did not result from historic, state-imposed de
jure segregation." 413 U.S. at 222 (emphasis in original). This interpretation was supported by Goodman, De Facto Segregation:A Constitutionaland EmpiricalAnalysis, 60
CALIF. L. REV. 275, 286 (1972). A more recent commentator, however, agreed with the
position taken here, suggesting that Justice Powell had "failed to refute or discredit
adequately the [Swann] Court's repeated insistence . . . that its concern was directed
only to segregation intentionally created or perpetuated by state authorities." Case
Comment, Keyes v. School District No. 1: Unlocking the Northern Schoolhouse Door, 9
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 124, 147 (1974).
26. In Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976), Justice Rehnquist ruled that where school officials had complied fully with the provisions of the
original desegregation decree, and where subsequent changes in racial composition
apparently resulted from random demographic movement and unchanged geographic
boundaries, then segregative action could not be charged to school officials. Id. at
431-40.
27. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 471 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); United States v. Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 491 (1972) (Burger,
C.J., concurring).
28. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
29. 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
30. In both instances Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell,
and Rehnquist. Because all four Justices are still on the Court, their alignment and
statements here may be important to future cases.
31. 407 U.S. at 492. This concept relating to the historic boundaries of local governments is also important in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 417 (1974).
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was the effect of the withdrawal from the county-wide system. The
discriminatory consequences of the withdrawal in Scotland Neck
would be "dramatically different from the effect which could be
anticipated in Emporia."32 This second point had evidentiary significance bearing upon the third factor-that the motivation for the separation was to create a predominantly white school system in Scotland
Neck,33 while that motivation was lacking in Wright.3 4
These cases foreshadowed more detailed analyses of intent in later
school segregation cases. While the discussions had no effect on the
holding of the cases in which they appeared, at least they raised the
intent issue which would gain significance as the courts began to deal
with school segregation in different contexts.
B.

Schools Without State Mandated Segregation:
Finding the Violation

1. Keyes v. School District No. 1
Keyes v. School District No. 135 was the first Supreme Court
decision in which school segregation had not been overtly imposed by
law. The case arose in Denver, Colorado, where a statutory dual
system had never existed. The Keyes Court was clearly aware of the
significance of the case in this regard, for it referred to its previous
decisions that were based on different facts:
[W]here plaintiffs prove that a current condition of segregated schooling exists within a school district where a dual
system was compelled or authorized by statute at the time of
our decision in [Brown I], the State automatically assumes an
affirmative duty "to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system." 6
The Court also described what the plaintiffs had to prove for the Court
to find a constitutional violation in the context of the Denver school
system. "Petitioners apparently concede for the purposes of this case
. . . [that] plaintiffs must prove not only that segregated schooling
exists but also that it was brought about or maintained by intentional
37
state action.
32. 407 U.S. at 492.
33. Id.
34. In contrast to ScotlandNeck, Justice Burger did not find in Wright any evidence

of "awkward gerrymandering or striking shift in racial proportions" which might afford
the "basis for an inference of racial motivation." Id. at 483.
35. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).

36. Id. at 200.
37. Id. at 198 (emphasis added).
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Interestingly, although the issue had never been officially decided,
even the plaintiffs assumed that intent was a required element of the
violation, and it was on the basis of this assumption that the case was
decided. 38 In fact, Justice Brennan's majority opinion stated that "the
differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de
facto segregation . . . is purpose or intent to segregate." 39 In other
words, in order to find unconstitutional segregation, there must be
purpose or intent to segregate.
The Court in Keyes made proof of intent easier for the plaintiffs
by recognizing that certain circumstances would shift the burden to
defendants. The Court held that "[i]ntentionally segregative actions in a
meaningful portion of a school system, "4 created a presumption "that
other segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious.'"'4
Finding intentional segregation on the part of the school authorities in
one part of the system was highly probative in assessing the intent
behind their actions in other parts of the same system. Drawing on
authorities in the field of evidence as well as from case law, the Court
created a presumption in plaintiff's favor.4 2 In addition, the Court
found it unnecessary for the plaintiffs to prove "the elements of de
jure segregation as to each and every school or each and every student
within the school system." 43 The Court looked at the system as a
whole; violations in important parts of the district resulted in liability
for the entire district.
38. Justice Douglas in a separate opinion, and Justice Powell in a concurring opinion, both objected to the distinction between de facto and de jure segregation, in which
the differentiating factor was intent. These opinions indicate that a finding of intent to
segregate was not yet constitutionally required, even though the plaintiffs in Keyes
conceded that it was.
39. 413 U.S. at 208 (emphasis in original). Joining the majority opinion were Justices
Stewart, Marshall, Douglas, and Blackmun. Justice Douglas also filed a separate opinion. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the result. Justice Powell filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion, while
Justice White took no part in the decision.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 207-08. The use of the presumption has come under strong attack. One
commentator has criticized the assumption underlying Keyes-that localized de jure
segregative actions are always relevant in subsequent litigation challenging school board
practices elsewhere in a school district. First, localized de jure practices may be too
remote in time to have any probative value as to other practices; second, rapid turnover
in school board membership may undermine the relevance of a de jure finding. These are
issues deserving careful scrutiny before the presumption is raised and the burden of
proof shifted. Case Comment, supra note 25, at 138-42.
43. Id. at 200.
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The Court noted a number of lower court findings which would be
significant when the presumption of segregative intent was applied on
remand. The district court had found that, with respect to about 40
percent of Denver's black student population, the board's actions
showed an undeviating purpose to isolate Negro students in segregated
schools while preserving the Anglo character of other schools. 44 The
intentional segregative conduct included rescission of a voluntary plan
to desegregate schools in the area, as well as segregative attendance
districts and use of classrooms. Noting that the purpose of the school
authorities was not "malicious or odious intent," 45 the district court
inferred segregative intent from the fact that "it was action which was
taken with knowledge of the consequences, and the consequences were
not merely possible, they were substantially certain. Under such conditions the action is unquestionably wilful." 46 This district court used a
tort test of foreseeability to find the intent required for a constitutional
violation.4 7 The district court also found "uncontroverted evidence"
of racial assignment of teachers and staff-'"a minority teacher to a
minority school throughout the.school system.''48
In his concurring opinion,49 Justice Powell eloquently decried the
finding of intent henceforth required in school desegregation cases. In
the progression of cases from Brown I through Swann, Powell saw the
development of an "affirmative-duty rule" which required school
districts "to alleviate conditions which in large part did not result from
historic, state-imposed de jure segregation." 50 Fearing the unpredictable and capricious resolution of the intent issue, Justice Powell
explained that he would neither "perpetrate the de jure/de facto
distinction nor . . . leave to petitioners the initial tortuous effort of
identifying 'segregative acts' and deducing 'segregative intent.' -51 As
this Note suggests, Justice Powell's fear may have been realized. 52 The
courts' findings of intent may be as capricious, and therefore as unfair,
as he predicted.
44. Id. at 198-99.
45. 303 F. Supp. 279, 286 (D.C. Colo. 1969).

46. Id.
47. Id. The acceptance of the lower court findings in Keyes apparently marked the

Court's first recognition of the objective standard of segregative intent. This "foreseeability test" has, however, followed a tortured path in recent Supreme Court decisions,
and its acceptability as a constitutional standard is somewhat doubtful.
48. 413 U.S. at 200.

49. Id. at 217.
50. Id.at 222 (emphasis in original).

51. Id.at 224.
52. See notes 194-244 infra and accompanying text.
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2.

Milliken v. Bradley
The next major "northern" case decided by the Supreme Court
involved school segregation in Detroit. In Milliken v. Bradley," the
Court was concerned primarily with determining the scope of the
remedy for the violation. Nevertheless, the case has some relevance to
the intent issue. The district court inferred the requisite intent from
actions taken by the Detroit Board of Education: the creation of
optional attendance zones, and the manner in which the board established school attendance districts had the "natural, probable, foreseeable, and actual effect" 4 of creating and perpetuating school segregation in Detroit. Thus, the lower court here, as in Keyes, 55 employed
the objective standard of foreseeable consequences to find segregative
intent. In addition, the school board's practices in school construction
had a segregative effect, and the school transportation program was
56
racially discriminatory.
The Supreme Court did not analyze in depth the finding of the
constitutional violation. Error in the lower court's findings of segregation was an issue raised in briefs 57 but it was not among the issues
presented to the Supreme Court for review. In a footnote, the Court
stated that the Detroit violation findings were not plain error and that
"under our decision last Term in Keyes . . . , the findings appear to
58
be correct."
In another footnote, the Court presaged future decisions such as
Washington v. Davis and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation.59 A finding of racial imbalance among pupils in a district may be used "as a signal which
operates simply to shift the burden of proof, . . . [but that] is a very
different matter from equating racial imbalance with a constitutional
6
violation calling for a remedy.'"'
53. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
54. 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971).
55. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
56. 338 F. Supp. at 588.
57. 418 U.S. at 738 n.18.
58. Id.
59. Metropolitan School Dist. v. Buckley, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Austin Indep. School
Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
60. 418 U.S. at 741 n.19.
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C.

Summary: Intent in UnconstitutionalSchool
Segregation before 1976

In a series of decisions from 1954 to 1972, the Supreme Court dealt
with school segregation cases in factual situations where the segregation had been mandated by state or local law. In this context the Court
focused upon the appropriate remedy for the acknowledged constitutional violation. Little emphasis needed to be placed on the elements of
the violation itself since segregation explicitly compelled by state law
was prohibited after Brown. 61
In some of the later cases, however, the issue of defendants' intent
or purpose began to arise. While intent was never the deciding factor in
these cases, in Swann,62 Wright,63 and Scotland Neck 64 Chief Justice
Burger spoke for himself, and others, about the importance of the
parties' intent in situations of actual segregation.
Swann raised the issue. 65 But in Swann de facto school segregation existed against a backdrop of residential segregation and a past
history of statutory segregation, and it was found that the school
system had not taken the affirmative action necessary to purge itself of
the effects of the statutory segregation. 66 Dictum indicated that school
segregation without deliberate attempts to segregate by school authorities might not be a constitutional offense. 67 Wright68 held that
intent to cause or maintain segregation was not necessary for a court to
prevent action that would deleteriously affect a constitutionally required desegregation plan. But four members of the Court dissented
on the intent issue. 69 While the cases were primarily concerned with
remedy, their facts bore a resemblance to the situation existing in
school districts across the country where segregation had not been
state-mandated, suggesting a "constitutional doctrine requiring affirmative state action to desegregate school systems.' '70
61.

347 U.S. 484 (1954).

62. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
63. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
64. 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
65. 402 U.S. at 16.

66. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
67. 402 U.S. at 11, 28, 32.

68. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
69. See notes 28-34 supra and accompanying text.
70. 413 U.S. at 220-21.
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Until Keyes, whenever the Supreme Court had found racially
segregated schools, it had ordered desegregation, but it had always
been able to trace the segregation back to a state mandate. Would the
Court follow Powell's suggestion and "expect that once the State has
assumed responsibility for education, local school boards will operate
integrated school systems within their respective districts?" 7 1 The
Court did not. Instead, it followed a laborious route, inferring discriminatory intent in the whole system from intent found in a substantial section. Saying that purpose or intent to discriminate was required
in order to find de jure segregation, the majority in Keyes then found a
constitutional violation throughout the system.
In Milliken,72 the Court upheld the lower court finding of a constitutional violation, based at least partially on intent inferred through
application of a foreseeability standard." The Court did not directly
deal with the question whether segregative intent is constitutionally
required. Nor did it explicitly decide, if intent is required, whether it is
sufficient to say that one intends the natural and probable consequences of one's actions. Until clearer exposition by the Court became
available, litigators could assume that intent was an essential element
of the constitutional violation in school discrimination cases, and that
the tort test of intent was sufficient. But, it was not clear that these
assumptions were constitutional standards.
III.

PRESENT INTENT REQUIREMENTS

Since Keyes the Supreme Court has written no opinion in a school
segregation, equal protection suit, focusing on the requirement of
intent or on the tests to be used to find intent. In Washington v.
Davis74 and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corporation," the Court has held that disproportionate
racial impact alone is not enough to prove an equal protection violation. However, Davis was an employment discrimination case, and
Arlington Heights involved zoning. The two recent Supreme Court
76
cases relating to schools, Metropolitan School District v. Buckley
and Austin Independent School Districtv. United States ,77 were sum71.

Id. at 225-26 (emphasis in original).
72. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
73. See notes 54-58 supra and accompanying text.
74. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
75. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
76. 429 U.S. 1068 (1977).
77. 429 U.S. 990 (1977).
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mary dispositions in which appellate court decisions were vacated, and
the cases remanded for reconsideration, in light of Davis and Arling7
ton Heights.
This treatment of the school cases may imply that the lower courts'
findings were unacceptable. Depending upon the interpretation of the
remands, the lower courts may find it necessary to make findings of
segregative intent that are much more specific than were previously
thought to be required. In addition, to play it safe (and avoid future
remands), the lower courts may apply different standards to find
intent than have generally been used before. These standards may
make it more difficult for plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent and,
when the burden of proof is on the other side, easier for defendants to
disprove it. The use of different-and probably more demandingstandards of intent may, or may not, be what the majority of the
Supreme Court had in mind. But it is arguable that the more rigorous
standards are not constitutionally required, at least by the terms of the
Court's equal protection theory as developed through Keyes and Milliken. It is important, therefore, that the four recent cases dealing with
intent be analyzed carefully in order to determine what the Court has
said, and what it has not said, about the parameters of discriminatory
intent.
A.
1.

Washington v. Davis

The Facts and Holding

Davis79 held that racial discrimination is a violation of the equal
protection clause only when there has been intent to discriminate.
Discriminatory impact alone is not enough. While courts and litigators
may have assumed that intent was an essential element, 0 before Davis
it was still open to question whether intent was an absolute requirement
8
of the constitutional violation. '
78. Both cases were remanded for reconsideration in light of Davis. Only in Buckley
was reconsideration in light of Arlington Heights required, since Austin was decided
prior to Arlington Heights.
79. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
80. For a discussion of this point in Keyes, see text accompanying note 39 supra. A
number of circuit courts ruling on the intent question prior to Keyes agreed that
segregative intent was essential to a constitutional violation. E.g., Deal v. Cincinnati Bd.
of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1967); Springfield School Comm. v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d
261 (1st Cir. 1965).
81. E.g., Note, Reading the Mind of the School Board:Segregative Intent and the De
Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALF, L.J. 317, 319 n.16 (1976); Comments of Willis
Caruso, Counsel for Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. (Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.), in conversation and speech, Case Western Reserve Univ. (April
2, 1977).
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In Davis, black applicants for employment as police officers in the
District of Columbia brought a class action suit claiming that recruiting
procedures were racially discriminatory. The Supreme Court upheld
the district court and overturned the appellate court, 82 finding that the
procedures violated neither the equal protection guarantee (contained
in the fifth amendment due process clause), nor the Equal Employment
Opportunities Act. 3 Plaintiffs had established that, as a result of a
particular personnel test, 84 a higher percentage of black police recruits
were excluded from police employment than were white police recruits. The Court indicated that, while the disproportion might be
relevant, the affirmative action of the police department in recruiting
blacks, and in its other procedures, negated any inference of intent to
85
discriminate on the basis of race.
The majority explained:
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by
the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule
. . . that racial classifications are to be subjected to the
strictest scrutiny
and are justifiable only by the weightiest of
86
considerations.
Justice White, writing for the majority, went on to say that "we have
not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise
within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of
one race than of another." 87 He recognized, however, that previous
cases had not always conveyed this principle. In particular, he discussed Palmer v. Thompson88 and Wright v. Council of Emporia,89
82. 426 U.S. at 239.
83. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). The black

applicants claimed statutory violations under Title VII along with their constitutional
claim. The Court agreed with the applicants that, unlike the constitutional claim, the

statutory claim arose simply on the basis of the disporportionate racial impact of hiring
and promotion practices. Discriminatory purpose need not be proved, and "a more
probing judicial review . . . than is appropriate under the Constitution" was to be
carried out. 426 U.S. at 247. The Court went on to hold, however, that the record
supported the district court's conclusion that the relationship between the written personnel test, on which the claim of discrimination was substantially based, and the
requirements.of the police training program were sufficient to validate the test under the
more rigorous statutory standards. Id. at 248-52.
84. The written personnel test in question, Test 21, is administered to nearly all
prospective federal government employees in order to determine the level of each
applicant's verbal skill. Id. at 245.
85. Id. at 246.
86. Id. at 242.
87. Id.
88. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
89. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
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which indicate "that in proper circumstances, the racial impact of90 a
law, rather than its discriminatory purpose, is the critical factor."
Justice White attempted to distinguish both Wright and Palmer
from the circumstances of Davis. In Wright the Court did not require
intent, but the inquiry focused upon effecting a remedy, and not upon
finding the initial equal protection violation. Although the distinction
may be a rational one-violation in Davis (requiring intent) and
remedy in Wright (requiring only effect)-it is interesting that the only
members of the Court who joined Justice White in Davis were the four
justices who had dissented in Wright. Perhaps the principles in the two
cases were not so easily distinguished, and, in fact, the dissent in
Wright had been vindicated, creating a new majority in Davis and the
subsequent cases. Nevertheless, Justice White contended that the rule
expounded in Davis had existed prior to Wright. He found support in
Keyes, 91 which was tried on the basis of the finding of discriminatory
intent. 92 Justice White had even greater difficulty in distinguishing
Palmer. The Court in Palmer specifically stated that the focus in
earlier cases "was on the actual effect of the enactments, not upon the
motivation which led the States to behave as they did." 9 3 In Davis,
Justice White argued that Palmer had only limited the inquiry directed
to the actual segregative motives of individual legislators. 94 Perhaps
more to the point was a footnote stating that, "to the extent that
Palmer suggests a generally applicable proposition that legislative
purpose is irrelevant in constitutional adjudication, our prior cases
• . . are to the contrary." 95 This suggests that Justice White, too, was
uncertain about the status of Palmer.
Despite these difficulties with Wright and Palmer, the opinion
stated that: "The school segregation cases have also adhered to the
basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law
claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a
90. 426 U.S. at 243.
91. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).

92. 426 U.S. at 243. The decision in Keyes, however, followed the decision in
Wright. Justice White's reference to Keyes and to "other later cases," id. at 244, was
part of an attempt to isolate Palmer and Wright from the mainstream of Court decisions

in which intent to discriminate was required. Despite these efforts, Justice White offered
no persuasive justification for the deviations in Wright and Palmer from the intent
requirement.
93. 403 U.S. at 225.
94. There is some language in Palmer which supports Justice White's contention:
"ihere is an element of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law because of the
bad motives of its supporters." Id. at 225. See Note, supra note 81, at 327.
95. 426 U.S. at 244 n.ll.
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racially discriminatory purpose.'"96 Again, the opinion cited to Keyes
which recognized "[t]he differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation
97

.

.

.

is purpose or intent to

segregate."
While the application of the Davis standard to school desegregation cases may not have been certain in light of Wright and Palmer,
the Court was apparently unanimous in applying the standard to the
constitutional issue presented in Davis. Five justices joined in the
opinion of the Court,98 one justice concurred, 99 and the dissent dealt
only with the statutory standards and their application. 100 The principle
is clear. Disproportionate impact alone is not sufficient to establish an
equal protection violation; the discrimination must be traced to an
intent to discriminate. The discussion of the principle was sufficiently
wide-ranging to indicate that intent is necessary to prove any constitutional violation based on racial discrimination. It is, therefore, important to examine closely the standards suggested in Davis for finding
discriminatory intent.
2.

Finding DiscriminatoryIntent

Both Justice White, in the majority opinion, and Justice Stevens, in
his concurring opinion, dealt with methods of proving intent. Justice
White summarized earlier Supreme Court cases to illustrate the manner
in which discriminatory intent was handled. These cases involved
discriminatory intent in a variety of contexts; among them, exclusion
of blacks from a grand jury, racial gerrymandering of political boundaries, school desegregation, and racially biased administration of an
ordinance.1 °1 The majority would allow discriminatory purpose to be
inferred from a wide range of evidentiary sources. First, intent need
not be express or appear on the face of the statute; 0 2 in other words,
the segregation laws of the recent past are not the only evidence
available to prove an intent to segregate. In addition, while disproportionate impact alone is not sufficient to prove intent, disproportionate
96. Id. at 240.
97. Id. (quoting Keyes v. School District No. 1,413 U.S. at 205, 208) (emphasis in
original).
98. Justice Stewart joined in parts I and II of the majority opinion, which included
the discussion of the constitutional issue. 426 U.S. at 252.
99. Justice Stevens wrote the separate concurring opinion. Id.
100. The dissent was written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justice Marshall. Id.
at 256.
101. See Id. at 239-42; Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1974); Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (citing
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880)).
102. 426 U.S. at 239-42.
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impact may be used to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory
purpose. 10 3 Once plaintiffs have established a prima facie case, the
burden of proof shifts to the defendant. Furthermore, in some situations-as in cases of systematic exclusion by race-the defendant may
find it difficult to explain the difference in racial impact on non-racial
grounds.1°4 The majority concluded, however, by re-emphasizing the
distinction to be drawn between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact:
Nevertheless, we have not held that a law, neutral on its face
• . . is invalid . . . simply because it may affect a greater

proportion of one race than of another. Disproportionate
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an
racial
discrimination
forbidden by the
invidious
5
Constitution. 10

In his concurrence, Justice Stevens focused directly upon the
evidentiary issue, and expressed dissatisfaction with the line drawn by
the majority between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact. He indicated that although it might be appropriate to frame the
constitutional claim in terms of the requirement of purposeful discrimination,
the burden of proving a prima facie case may well involve
differing evidentiary considerations.
Frequently, the most probative evidence of intent will be
objective evidence of what actually happened rather than
evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor.
For normally the actor is presumed to have intended the
naturalconsequences of his deeds. "
103. Id. For a further discussion of the prima facie case and presumption of segregative intent, see the Keyes analysis, notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
104. 426 U.S. at 242. For support the Court cited a 1942 decision finding unconstitu-

tional racial discrimination in the selection of grand juries. "[C]hance or accident could
hardly have accounted for the continuous omission of negroes from the grand jury lists
for so long a period as sixteen years or more." Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404 (1942).
This method of proof, known as the "rule of exclusion", has been reiterated by the
Court in recent years. See Castaneda v. Parida, 97 S. Ct. 1272 (1977); Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
105. 426 U.S. at 242.
106. Id. at 253 (emphasis added). For a detailed discussion of the distinction between
subjective and objective intent, see Note, supra note 81. Justice Stevens added that
"although I accept th, statement of the general rule in the Court's opinion, I am not yet
prepared to indicate how that standard should be applied in the many cases which have
formulated the governing standard in differing language." 426 U.S. at 254. He specifically withheld judgment on the merits of the lower court cases which the majority had
overruled because the cases held "that the substantially disproportionate racial impact
of a statute . . . without regard to discriminary purpose, suffices to prove racial
discrimination .... " Id. at 244.
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The distinction between discriminatory purpose and impact was "not
nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of the
Court's opinion might assume." 107 In other words, the same evidence
may be used to find a dramatic discriminatory impact and to infer
discriminatory intent. From the same evidence one may come to
different legal conclusions, the one building on the other.
The conclusion to be drawn from Davis is that discriminatory
purpose or intent is required to establish a constitutional violation.
However, the case does not explain what, if any, additional tests are
appropriate for finding intent in school segregation cases. Since the
Court in Davis did not find the requisite intent to discriminate, it does
not even give a picture of what is appropriate in employment discrimination cases. The opinion does refer to Keyes, however, as an example
of a school segregation case where segregative intent was found, 10 8
indicating approval of the tests used there. This means that the prima
facie case shifting the burden to defendant may probably be used, and
the intent may be inferred from the natural consequences of the
09
action. 1
B.
1.

Austin Independent School District v. United States

Supreme Court Action

The first school desegregation case that the Supreme Court considered after the landmark Davis decision related to segregation of
black and Mexican-American students in Austin, Texas. 110 In Austin
Independent School District v. United States 11 the court of appeals
had found unconstitutional segregation and ordered an extensive district-wide remedy. On December 6, 1976, six months after deciding
Davis, the Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgement of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals and remanded the case for reconsideration in
light of Davis."12
Four justices" 3 joined in the per curiam decision; two" l4 joined a
concurring opinion written by Justice Powell; and two dissented'15
"because they were persuaded that the court of appeals correctly
107.
108.
109.
110.
II1.
112.
113.
114.
115.

426 U.S. at 254.
Id. at 240.
See notes 41-48 supra and accompanying text.
Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1977).
532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1976).
429 U.S. 990 (1977).
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Stewart, and White.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist.
Justices Brennan and Marshall.
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interpreted and applied the relevant decisions of this Court." 116 This
summary disposition did not elaborate where the conflict may lie
between the court of appeals' decision and Davis. However, Justice
Powell's concurrence may provide insight into the thinking of at least
three of the seven justices who did not accept the appellate court's
judgment.
Justice Powell's opinion was concerned primarily with the appellate court's decision regarding the remedy for the constitutional violation. Nevertheless, he recognized that if the court of appeals found no
violation on remand, there would be no need to consider the propriety
of the remedy. One sentence in the concurring opinion indicated
Justice Powell's concern with the finding of intent. "As suggested by
this Court's remand premised upon Washington v. Davis, supra, the
Court of Appeals may have erred by a readiness to impute to school
officials a segregative intent far more pervasive than the evidence
justified."" 7 In a footnote, he elaborated on the aspect of the finding
that concerned him.
Although in an earlier stage in this case other findings were
made which evidenced segregative intent, . . . the opinion
below apparently gave controlling effect to the use of neighborhood schools; ". . . A segregated school system is the
foreseeable and inevitable result of [a neighborhood] assignment policy. When this policy is used, we may infer that
the
11 8
school authorities have acted with segregative intent." ,
Perhaps Justice Powell, joined by two other members of the Court,
was saying that the tort test, by which an actor is assumed to intend the
foreseeable consequences of his actions, is not an appropriate test for
19
finding segregative intent. This would appear to conflict with Keyes"
and perhaps even with Davis (which referred back to Keyes as precedent for its holding). It is also arguable that Powell intended to say
that, as the only evidence of intent, the test is insufficient under the
circumstances. Further analysis of the case's preceding history and
facts may help to clarify the possible conflict with Davis.
2.

Lower Court History: Facts and Holding

The appellate court decision 120 vacated by the. Supreme Court was
the last of a series of decisions involving litigation begun in 1970. The
Austin school system was, at the time of Brown, racially segregated
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

97 S. Ct. at 520 (quoted material omitted in official reporter, 490 U.S. 990,995).
429 U.S. at 991.
Id. at 991 n.! (citation omitted).
See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1976).
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by statute. Because of this history of statutory segregation, and because the school system had taken no affirmative steps to eliminate the
effects of that past segregation, the district court found a constitutional
violation requiring a remedy. The court of appeals affirmed this
finding. 121

Although the Austin schools had been statutorily segregated, the
segregation was between black and white students. Mexican-Americans were included in the white population for this statutory purpose
and the district court in Austin found no de jure segregation against
Mexican-Americans. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned
this finding as clearly erroneous. 122 The Austin school system had, "in
its choice of school site location, construction and renovation of
schools, drawing of attendance zones, student assignment and transfer
policies, and faculty and staff assignments, caused and perpetuated the
segregation of Mexican-American students within the school system." 123 It then remanded for a new desegregation plan consistent with
its holding.
The appellate court found a constitutional violation without finding
segregative intent. "It is not necessary to prove discriminatory motive,
purpose, or intent as a prerequisite to establishing an equal protection
violation when discriminatory effect is present."' 24 To support this
statement, the court cited a long list of southern school segregation
cases, as well as a few non-school cases. 125 At least to the Fifth
Circuit, it was not apparent in 1972 that intent was an essential element
of the violation.
After this decision, and before the district court made further
determinations, Keyes v. School DistrictNo. 1126 was decided by the
Supreme Court. Afterwards, the district court dealt with several issues,
including the discrimination against Mexican-Americans. It
held that its finding of past intentional segregation of blacks
constituted a prima facie case of intentional segregation of
Mexican-Americans. It concluded, however, that the [Austin
school authorities] had successfully rebutted this prima facie
case by demonstrating that its racial policies had been unrelated to its treatment of Mexican-Americans and that there
was an27absence of segregative intent toward Mexican-Americans. 1

121. 467 F.2d 848, 854 (5th Cir. 1972).
122. Id. at 864.
123. Id. at 865 (footnotes omitted).

124. Id. at 865 n.25.
125. Id.
126. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
127. 532 F.2d at 385-86.
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In Austin 11,128 decided in 1976, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed the district court findings in light of Keyes. While it was
argued before the court that the Keyes requirement of intent was
"limited by the plaintiffs' concession in that case that they had the
burden of proving intentional state action and by the obvious segregative purpose of the Denver school authorities,"'' 29 the Austin I court
rejected this contention. "[T]o the extent that . . .Austin I applied
of
cause-and-effect tests and rejected the requirement of a showing
' 130
Keyes."
by
supervened
was]
case
[that
intent,
discriminatory
131
The Fifth Circuit accepted the distinction delineated in Keyes
between de jure and de facto segregation. This is the same distinction
described in Davis, decided one month after Austin II. To the Fifth
Circuit, Keyes appeared to be the landmark case for discriminatory
intent in the school segregation cases. Yet Davis must have been more
than just a restatement of the Keyes holding; otherwise it would be
difficult to explain why the Supreme Court remanded Austin II for
reconsideration in light of Davis.
3.

Implicationsfor Finding DiscriminatoryIntent

The manner in which the court found the requisite intent is interesting and may shed some light on the Supreme Court's remand of this
decision. The court of appeals said that the plaintiffs must prove three
things in order to establish a prima facie case of unconstitutional
segregation of Mexican-Americans: "(1) that there is segregation in
public schools, (2) that state officials have, with segregative intent,
taken or refrained from taking certain actions, and (3) that the present
segregated system is a result of the action or inaction." 1 32 The court
found all three elements, including the requisite intent, and therefore
overruled the district court and reaffirmed its previous decision. The
standard applied was the basic tort law rule that people intend the
128. 532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1972).
129. Id. at 387.
130. Id. at 388.
131. 413 U.S. at 208.
132. 532 F.2d at 386. What constitutes an "action" for purposes of finding segregative intent has presented difficulty. Some have argued that inaction, such as failure to
counteract racial imbalance arising from demographic movements, will not support a
constitutional violation. The argument is of little merit. While it may be true that
segregative intent is easier to prove in cases of positive action than passive inaction, the
essential point is that a decision had to be made whether to act or not to act. A decision
either way has significant racial consequences, and thus the action-inaction distinction is
hardly a persuasive one. See Case Comment, supra note 25, at 149 n. 100; Note, supra
note 68, at 330-32.
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naturai and foreseeable consequences of their actions.' 33 The court
found the rule to be faithful to Keyes and also mentioned policy
reasons behind this standard.
First, the foreseeability test must be employed due to the extreme
difficulty, and even futility, of obtaining direct evidence of the offi34
cials' intent. For this reason courts rely on circumstantial evidence. 1
Second, this test is consistent with that applied under Section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act "under which many school desegregation cases
are brought.' ' 135 This second argument may have lost some of its
vitality, since Davis distingyished between requirements for finding
statutory, as contrasted with constitutional, violations in employment
cases, an area where-prior to Davis-the two standards were considered to be the same. 136 The court also indicated that an affirmative
duty to desegregate may not exist without the prior finding of a
violation. Nevertheless, "the refusal of school authorities to take
affirmative action that would desegregate the school system may be
probative of the segregative intent underlying various actions of those
137
officials.'"
In applying these articulated standards, the Austin I court found
segregative intent and effects prejudicing Mexican-Americans. It held that
the schools did not rebut this prima facie case of segregative action
against Mexican-Americans.
[T]he case before us presents not only the use of a neighborhood assignment policy in a residentially segregated school
district, but also the taking of an extensive series of actions
dating back to the early twentieth century that had the natural, foreseeable, and avoidable result of creating
and main38
taining an ethnically segregated school system.
The question then becomes, what must the court of appeals do differently on remand from the Supeme Court? Did Davis add something to
133. 532 F.2d at 388. In a footnote the court noted that the First, Second, and Third
Circuits had also read the foreseeability test into the Keyes requirement of segregative
intent. Id. at 389 n.6.

134. Id. at 388.
135. Id. at 389.
136. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
137. 532 F.2d at 389 (footnote omitted). This aspect of the foreseeability test has
come under sharp criticism. The logic of the forseeability test could lead to the requirement of the elimination of all racial imbalance in public schools. "As a practical matter,
the effect of a 'reasonably forseeable' test is to impose an affirmative obligation to
promote integration, since 'intent' will be inferred in any action which perpetuates or
aggravates segregation. Intent becomes something of a fiction." Case Comment, supra
note 25, at 149 n.99. Other commentators have made similar arguments. E.g., Note,
supra note 81, at 329.
138. 532 F.2d at 392.
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Keyes in defining a constitutional standard of intent? If so, why did the
Davis opinion stress its consistency with Keyes? What did it add?
Or perhaps Davis did not add to Keyes anything significant for
school cases. Did the Austin Hf court misinterpret, or misapply, the
Keyes standards? If that was the problem seen by the Supreme Court,
then why did it remand? Why did it not just reverse because the Austin
H court had not properly applied established law?
The concurring opinion expresses some concern about the standard
used in Austin H. Perhaps Justice Powell was merely requesting more
precise articulation of the facts on which the court based its conclusion. Maybe Austin Hf should have repeated the finding of intentional
discrimination against Mexican-Americans prior to 1954, in addition
to the inferences of intent from th6 neighborhood school policy.
Possibly there is an implication that finding intent under the tort
standard may not be adequate to find the unconstitutional intent.
Additional explanation would have been helpful to enable the Fifth
Circuit to deal with the remand.
C.

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corporation

1. Facts and Holding
One month after it remanded Austin II, the Supreme Court again
confronted the intent requirement in an alleged equal protection violation.139 In a full opinion, the Court found no constitutional violation
where the refusal of a village to rezone had a discriminatory impact on
blacks who wanted to live in low and moderate income housing units
proposed for construction on the rezoned land. The holding reiterated
the principle set down in Davis that "official action will not be held
unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate
impact . . . . Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is
required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." 140 Again
the Court argued that this position was consistent with cases prior to
Davis. "Although some contrary indications may be drawn from some
of our cases,' 4 1 the holding in Davis reaffirmed a principle well
established in a variety of contexts. E.g., Keyes v. School DistrictNo.
.

. 142
.

139. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977).
140. Id. at 265.
141. As in Davis, the Court referred specifically to Palmer and Wright. Id. at 265
n.10. For an analysis of the Palmer and Wright decisions, see notes 88-97 supra and

accompanying text.
142. 429 U.S. at 265.
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Respondents had made an application for the rezoning of land to
allow building of low and moderate income housing and challenged,
on constitutional grounds, the decision by the Village of Arlington
Heights to deny the rezoning request. The two basic issues in the case
were whether respondents had standing, and whether there was a
143
constitutional violation. The Supreme Court found proper standing,
but found no equal protection violation where there was no intent to
discriminate. The district court had concluded the village was not
motivated by racial or economic discrimination; their motivation was
to protect "property values and the integrity of the Village's zoning
plan."" 4 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals approved the district
court's finding on motivation, but found that the racially discriminatory impact of the village's decision was enough to establish a violation of respondents' constitutional rights, when the reasons given for
the refusal to rezone did not show sufficiently compelling state interests.
The Supreme Court reviewed, and five members 145 upheld the
concurrent findings of both lower courts regarding intent. Writing for
the majority Justice Powell, relied upon the decision in Davis, and
explained that "[r]espondents simply failed to carry their burden of
proving that discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the
Village's decision.' ' 146 Respondents litigated on the theory that discriminatory impact alone was unconstitutional. "But both courts below understood that at least part of their function was to examine the
purpose underlying the decision."' 4 7 The dissenters expressed their
disagreement with the majority's review of the record and use of the
principles of Davis. Davis had been handed down after the court of
appeals' decision, so Justices Marshall, Brennan, and White considered
it appropriate to remand the case to the appellate court for further
proceedings in light of Davis.
Justice White, who wrote the Davis opinion, dissented in Arlington Heights because the lower courts had not had the benefit of the
Court's decision in Davis."4 8 This implies that, prior to Davis, at least
in the context of zoning cases, it was not universally recognized that
discriminatory intent was required in order to find an equal protection
violation. To be consistent with Austin, the Court apparently should
143. Id. at 260-64.
144. Id. at 259.
145. Justices Burger, Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist joined in the majority opinion, written by Justice Powell.
146. 429 U.S. at 270.
147. Id. at 268.
148. Id. at 272.
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have remanded. Or conversely, to be consistent with Arlington
Heights and Davis, the Court should probably have reviewed and
decided Austin without remanding. Was the Court saying that the
intent requirement in school segregation cases was not as clear prior to
Davis as it was in zoning cases? Or was it perhaps saying that in
Austin the wrong tests for intent were used, or the correct tests were
misapplied, whereas in Arlington Heights the courts correctly applied
the appropriate tests to the facts?
2.

FindingDiscriminatoryIntent

The majority opinion went into some detail in describing circumstances in which intent may be determined. While Justices Brennan
and Marshall dissented from the Court's review of the lower courts'
decisions on intent, they concurred in Justice Powell's articulation of
ways to determine intent. 149 First, Justice Powell noted that a plaintiff
does not have "to prove that the challenged action rested solely on
racially discriminatory purposes."' 150 Nor does it need to be a "dominant" or "primary" purpose. Instead, the decision speaks to whether
"a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision.' 5 1 Justice Powell suggested determining intent by "a sensitive
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be
52
available."
A "starting point" for this determination of intent may be the
"impact of the official action," 153 as noted in Davis. The appellate
court in Arlington Heights did find this threshold discriminatory impact; the Supreme Court did not contest this finding. 154 The result of
the denial for rezoning was the continued exclusion of blacks from the
village. But the exclusion was sufficient only to raise the possibility of
discriminatory intent, and not to prove it. "Sometimes a clear pattern,
149. Id. at 271. Justice White, in his separate dissent, disagreed with the need for
discussion of the intent standard. Id. at 272.
150. Id. at 265-66 (emphasis added).

151. Id. For a critical analysis of the dominant motive issue, see Brest, Palmer v.
Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of UnconstitutionalLegislative Motive, 1971
Sup. CT. REV. 95, 119.
152. 429 U.S. at 266.
153. Id.
154. Counsel for respondent, Willis Caruso, indicated in a conversation that, had they
known the standards the Supreme Court would apply, they would have been able to
show evidence sufficient to satisfy the intent requirement. See Comments of Willis
Caruso, note 81 supra. This' conclusion is totally opposite from that reached by the

Supreme Court, after reviewing the record. Even taking into account the obvious
advocacy stance of Mr. Caruso, one can see from the facts as described by the Supreme

Court at least the possibility of sufficient evidence of intent, 429 U.S. at 255-58,
particularly if the lower court had had these articulated standards, or those from Davis.
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unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of
the state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on
its face."' 155 Actually, this standard involves several elements, 1) a
clear pattern, 2) unexplainable other than by race, and 3) neutral
legislation. The examples given in the opinion show extreme situations
of near or absolute exclusion. 156 As Justice Powell indicated, these
cases are rare, but easy when found. Similar examples were given in
Davis. 57 The question remains, however,what the lower limits of the
standard might be. 158 In any event, the appropriate circumstances were
159
not found to exist in Arlington Heights.
The Court further stated that "[t]he historical background of the
decision is one evidentiary source, particularly if it reveals a series of
official actions taken for invidious purposes." 160 This standard is
related to the clear pattern standard mentioned above, with the major
difference being one of degree. A series of official actions (implying
previous similar actions, perhaps occasionally interspersed with dissimilar actions) would probably be of less probative value than a clear
pattern (implying little or no deviation from incident to incident). The
court of appeals found that while a buffer policy for rezoning had not
been followed with unwavering consistency, there were times when it
61
had been the basis for denial for rezoning proposals.'
155. 429 U.S. at 266.
156. The most obvious example is that of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). A
San Francisco ordinance, on its face apparently neutral, prohibited the operation of a
laundry without the consent of city officials except in brick or stone buildings. Permits to
operate laundries in wooden buildings subsequently were granted to all but one of the
non-Chinese applicants, but to none of approximately 200 Chinese applicants. In a suit
brought by a Chinese alien who had been convicted under the ordinance after being
denied a permit, the Supreme Court found unconstitutional discrimination in violation of
the equal protection clause. "Though the law be fair on its face . . . if it is applied...
so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances . . . the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution." Id. at 373.
157. 426 U.S. at 241-42.
158. Justice Powell did indicate that a statistical pattern less clear-cut than the one
present in Yick Wo would be sufficient to support a constitutional violation in jury
selection cases. 429 U.S. at 266 n.13.
159. Justice Powell also emphasized that a consistent pattern is not always necessary
to support an equal protection violation; a single "invidiously discriminatory governmental act" may suffice under certain circumstances. Id. at 266 n. 14.
160. Id. at 267.
161. The adoption by cQurts of a standard of consistency for the evaluation of school
board policy has received mixed reviews from commentators.
There is no reason either to expect or to require absolute consistency from
school boards. . . .School boards change composition from year to year, and
the membership in the prevailing majority may change from decision to decision. The "same" school board does not make all contemporaneous, much less
successive decisions.

1977]

SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

"The specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged
decision" 1 62 may illuminate the purpose behind the decision. The
Court here indicated that it could probably find intent in a situation
where there is specific action to rezone while a project is being
planned, where the original zoning would have permitted the proposed
buildings. Perhaps this indicates that it is relatively easier to infer
intent from action, such as rezoning, as contrasted with inaction, such
as refusing to rezone. 163 It also reflects an assumption of the legitimacy
of the status quo. In Arlington Heights, the village had refused to
rezone, which provided little or no evidence of the kind described.
"Departures from the normal procedural sequence"' 164 may provide some evidence of discrminatory purpose: they lead to the further
inquiry of whether the departures were discriminatory. The Court
found that overall the "rezoning request progressed according to the
usual procedures.' 165 At the same time, it noted two deviations; the
relevance of one deviation was not explained in the record, 166 and the
second-additional hearings-was found to be "at least in part" 1 67 an
accommodation to the developers.
"Substantive departures too may be relevant, particularly if the
factors usually considered important by the decisionmaker strongly
favor a decision contrary to the one reached." 68 This situation was not
found by the Court in Arlington Heights. Here the key word is
"strongly," in the sense that a decision will probably be presumed to
be valid unless it is almost totally inconsistent with articulated bases on
which similar decisions have usually been made.
"The legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant,
especially where there are contemporary statements by members of the
decision-making body, minutes of its meetings, or reports." 169 In this
case, the records apparently were neutral. One member of the village
board testified at the trial, but the Court found "nothing in her
testimony to support an inference of invidious purpose." 170 The Court
Note, Reading the Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De
Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317, 337 n.94 (1976).
162. 429 U.S. at 267.
163. For an analysis of the action-inaction distinction, see note 132 supra.
164. 429 U.S. at 267.

165. Id. at 269.
166. The village planner whose primary responsibility involved zoning was never

asked for his opinion.
167. 429 U.S. at 270.
168. Id. at 267.
169. Id. at 268.

170. Id.at 270.
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appeared reluctant to use this testimony, or to allow more than what
the district court permitted, because of a general policy against "intru171
sion into the workings of other branches of government."
The above examples were illustrative of "subjects of proper in72
quiry in determining whether racially discriminatory intent existed."'
They did not purport to be exhaustive, 173 indicating that intent
may be inferred from circumstances other than those enumerated here.
Presumably each, or a combination of several such circumstances,
may be conclusive of intent in appropriate situations. The examples
used by the Court are illustrative and particularly interesting when they
are applied to the particular facts presented in Arlington Heights. It
remains to be seen, however, how they may be applied in other
contexts. It is also important to analyze what other circumstances, not
listed in Arlington Heights, may show the discriminatory intent that is
an element of an equal protection violation. Particularly relevant here
is the fact that this case did not deal with school segregation. There
probably are other standards that may not be appropriate for discussion
in a zoning context but are relevant to finding intent in school cases.
D.

Metropolitan School District v. Buckley: The IndianapolisCase

1.

Supreme Court Action

Approximately two weeks after the Supreme Court decided Arlington Heights, in January, 1977, the Court vacated the judgment of the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Metropolitan School District v.
Buckley' 74 and, in a summary disposition, remanded it for further
consideration in light of Davis and Arlington Heights. The remand
was a six to three decision, with Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens dissenting. There was no elaboration of the remand or dissent.
2.

Lower Court: Facts and Holding

Buckley involved a metropolitan-wide remedy for school desegregation and also injunctive relief for segregative housing practices by
the state. 175 The litigation began with the United States bringing suit to
desegregate the Indianapolis schools. It was eventually expanded to
include the metropolitan area school districts, because the court found
that the expansion of the municipal government to include the entire
171. Id. at 268 n.18.
172. Id. at 268.
173. Id.

174. 429 U.S. 1068 (1977).
175. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs., 541 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1976).
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county, while the state legislature expressly prevented the school
district boundaries from expanding in the same way, effectively kept
blacks almost exclusively in Indianapolis and its school system. The
siting of low-income, almost exclusively black housing projects within
the Indianapolis school district, despite the government's authority to
site them beyond those school boundaries, had the same effect.
The court of appeals upheld the district court, finding two violations of the equal protection clause.
The first was the failure of the state to extend the boundaries
of the Indianapolis Public School District . . . when the
municipal government of Indianapolis and other governmental units in Marion County, Indiana, were replaced by a consolidated county-wide government called Uni-Gov. The second violation was the confinement of all public housing projects (in which 98 percent of the residents are black)
to areas
76
within the boundaries of the City of Indianapolis.
The court of appeals made no specific findings of intent because it
analogized its concerns to those in Wright. 177 While Wright did not
permit redistricting which would have thwarted efforts to remedy the
constitutional wrong, in Buckley the court said that a refusal to redistrict, when consolidation has occurred throughout the rest of the state,
could not be used to impede the constitutional remedy. The court of
appeals found that the violations were sufficient to uphold a metropolitan school desegregation remedy and an injunction against further
discriminatory siting of government housing.
In an articulate dissent, Judge Tone argued no constitutional violation should have been found because of the recent Davis decision, and
because the court had not found the requisite intent to discriminate
which is an essential element of an equal protection violation. 178 While
the majority was concerned that the interdistrict remedy complied with
the mandate of Milliken, " the dissent insisted there was no interdis80
trict violation to necessitate an interdistrict remedy.'
3.

Implications for Finding Intent

In view of the recommended reconsideration of Buckley in light of
Davis and Arlington Heights, a majority of the Court was apparently
not satisfied with the Seventh Circuit's holding of constitutional viola176. Id. at 1212.
177. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
178. 541 F.2d at 1224.

179. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
180. 541 F.2d at 1224-28.
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tion without specific findings of discriminatory intent. Neither the
court of appeals nor the district court made a specific finding of intent.
There were, however, several instances in which there was some
discussion of motivation. For example, mentioning resistance to a plan
to consolidate school districts in the county, the appellate court indicated that "there is no evidence that this opposition was racially
motivated.'" 8
In another instance the court cited actions of the state legislature
which took away the opportunity for the Indianapolis school district to
expand its boundaries at a time when the legislature knew that a school
desegregation plan was pending. By drawing "reasonable and logical
inferences from probable consequences of changes in the law and the
evident purpose of such changes,"' 182 the court found a legislative
intent not to expand the school system boundaries. The court did not
go further and specifically draw the inference that the legislature
therefore intended to maintain the racial segregation that existed. The
district court did indicate, however, that "[w]hen the General Assembly expressly eliminated the schools from consideration under UniGov, it signaled its lack of concern with the whole problem and thus
inhibited desegregation . ...183
When the court on remand considers discriminatory intent, it may
be able to apply to this fact pattern the evidentiary sources suggested in
Arlington Heights. 184 Certainly the Buckley court cannot find that the
state's action was based solely on a racially discriminatory purpose,
but this is not required.' 85 If one applies the means of investigation
suggested in Arlington Heights, some do not lead to an inference of
intent. For example, the evidentiary record does not present a clear
pattern that cannot be explained on other than racial grounds. Moreover, the court found a number of rational explanations other than race
for the failure to allow expansion of the school district to include the
suburbs. 8 6 Yet, when one views the school district's exemption from
expansion in light of the "historical background of the decision," and
the "specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged deci181. Id. at 1216.
182. Id. at 1220.
183. Id. at 1221 (emphasis added).
184. See notes 154-71 supra and accompanying text.
185. See note 171 supra and accompanying text.
186. For example, the court of appeals noted that the school board had argued that
consolidation of all the schools would result in an oversized school district with consequent loss of citizen participation and increased taxes. The court admitted these to be
"substantial reasons" for a failure to consolidate, and "apparently not racially
motivated." 541 F.2d at 1220-21. For a discussion of the Arlington Heights standards,
see notes 155-59 supra and accompanying text.
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sion,"' 187 evidence of possible discriminatory intent begins to come
into focus.
School districts throughout the state had been consistently consolidated over a period of several years by state mandate. Marion
County school districts, including those in Indianapolis, had not been
consolidated. Attempts to achieve voluntary consolidation had been
thwarted by the suburban school districts. During the period of resistance, the school desegregation suit was pending, and the Indiana
legislature and the suburban school districts were aware of the possible
implications of the suit. Sixteen days after the legislature specifically
repealed a provision which had provided for automatic, contemporaneous extension of school district boundaries as city boundaries
expanded, the state adopted a metropolitan system of government for
Marion County. As the court of appeals said, "[b]ecause, in 1969, 95
percent of the blacks in Marion County lived in the inner city and
segregation in its schools was under attack in federal court, it is clear to
us that Uni-Gov and its companion 1969 legislation were [a] substantial cause of interdistrict segregation."1 88 Considering this finding in
conjunction with the above facts, it may be possible to find not only
the segregative effect of the decisions, but also the requisite segregative intent.
The record showed that if events in Indianapolis and Marion
County had proceeded as would have been expected from the patterns
and procedures established throughout the rest of the state, "Marion
County would be either a consolidated school district under the 1959
School Reorganization Act or [the Indianapolis public school system]
would have been expanded with the civil city of Indianapolis under
Uni-Gov."' 8 9 There was, therefore, a substantial departure from the
policy practiced throughout the rest of the state. The sequence of all
the events preceeding the states' action, including initiation of the
school segregation suit, combined with the documented segregative
effect create a possible inference of discriminatory intent. These are a
few of the several factors suggested in Arlington Heights for
"[d]etermining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a
' 19°
motivating factor."
Of course, the court could find that race was a motivating factor
without finding race to be the motivating factor, or even a dominant or
187. See notes 160-62 supra and accompanying text.
188. 541 F.2d at 1220.

189. Id. at 1221.
190. 429 U.S. at 266.
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primary factor.' 9' If race was one of the factors in the decision, then
that racial consideration may have been what tipped the balance sufficiently to have caused the decision to be made in the manner in which
it was, resulting in the maintenance of segregation. Determining the
effect of a given factor on a decision is more difficult than simply
identifying all the factors involved. Therefore, it may be that when
unconstitutional racial motive is identified as one factor in the decision-making process, the whole decision is tainted. 192
There is no indication in the Arlington Heights and Davis opinions
that the above would not be an acceptable approach on remand. In fact,
this approach to finding intent follows the suggestions made in Arlington Heights and, therefore, appears consistent with the guidelines
enumerated by Justice Powell. Although the guidelines suggest
evidentiary sources for finding intent, they do not describe a legal
standard. On remand, the court must still determine the quantum of
proof legally necessary to establish discriminatory intent and a constitutional violation.
E.

Summary

In the four cases described above, the Supreme Court has made a
clear statement: discriminatory intent is an essential element of an
equal protection violation with regard to racial discrimination. Unless
actions resulting in a discriminatory impact are linked to discriminatory intent, they do not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. Declaring discriminatory intent to be essential partially
defined the legal standard, but the intent required is still unclear. The
significance of Davis and Arlington Heights is that they began to
shape the contours of the constitutional intent requirement. The outer
limits appear to be that while intent need not be explicit, neither can it
be entirely inferred from segregative effect.
Consistency and rationality in the disposition of the four cases is
somewhat difficult to discern. In the employment and zoning cases
(Davis and Arlington Heights) the Court applied its standards to the
191. For an analysis of the Court's discussion in Arlington Heights concerning the
issue of race as a dominant factor in a decision, see notes 150-51 supra and accompanying text.
192. The Court in Arlington Heights indicated in a footnote, however, that identifying
a discriminatory motive would operate only to shift the burden of proof. "Proof that the
decision . . . was motivated in part by a racially discriminatory purpose would not
necessarily have required invalidation of the challenged decision. Such proof would,
however, have shifted. . . the burden of establishing that the same decision would have
resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered." 429 U.S. at 270-71.
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record, and decided the constitutional questions. In the area of school
desegregation, appellate court decisions were accepted for certiorari,
and then summarily remanded without elaboration. Yet in all but
Austin (a school case) there was apparently some question in the
minds of the lower courts as to whether they had to find intent. The
Court gave suggestions for finding intent in the full opinions, but they
were not exhaustive, and covered a wide variety of factual contexts.
Finding intent in school desegregation cases will require taking the
broad outlines of the Supreme Court decisions and filling in the
analysis from other lower court and Supreme Court school cases. Since
the Supreme Court cases have been discussed,193 the next section deals
with ways in which the various federal circuits have found discriminatory intent in school segregation cases.
IV.

FINDINGS OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT IN THE CIRCUITS

A.

Introduction

A review of some current standards used by various circuits may
elucidate the tests which are appropriate for finding intent in school
segregation cases. This review will cover only a few of the myriad
school segregation cases. The issues and fact patterns of school cases
are sufficiently complex to provide a variety of approaches; at the
same time, the similarity of the factual patterns makes it easier to
compare these cases.
The fact pattern generally presented is a long history of action and
inaction by school officials against a background of varying student
populations. 94 This history of school board decisions covers a wide
variety of subjects, such as student attendance zones, assignment of
faculty, location of new school facilities, and expenditures, all of
193. See notes 110-39, 174-92 supra and accompanying text. While the Supreme
Court suggested ways of finding discriminatory intent, the discussion was only suggestive in regard to school desegregation cases; it was not conclusive. The two school cases,
Austin and Buckley, were remanded for reconsideration in light of an employment
discrimination case and a zoning discrimination case. The district and appeals courts in
the two cases must now make the redetermination, subject again to possible Supreme
Court review. Presumably they will use standards similar to those used in the lower
courts in similar cases, if those standards are not (apparently) invalid because of recent
Supreme Court cases.
194. Litigation may ensue because the complaining parties have determined that no
more can be done to develop voluntary desegregation. E.g., Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F.
Supp. 410, 417-21 (D.C. Mass. 1974). Often a single event, such as the recission of a
desegregation plan, may trigger a suit. E.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189
(1973).
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which work together to make a segregated or non-segregated school
district. This broad spectrum of decision-making provides varied
evidentiary sources, and necessitates distinct methods for drawing
inferences of discriminatory intent, different from the analysis in95
volved in a single action such as the denial of a rezoning application. 1
As Justice Stevens said in his concurring opinion in Davis: "Although
it may be proper to use the same language to describe the constitutional
claim in each of these contexts, the burden of proving a prima facie
1 96
case may well involve differing evidentiary considerations."
The following analysis will present several ways in which various
circuits have found, or have not found, discriminatory intent. All the
cases were decided after the Supreme Court decision in Keyes, 197 the
decision that differentiated between de facto and de jure segregation,
and laid the groundwork for the decision three years later in Davis.
The cases following Keyes most clearly recognized the intent requirement and developed standards for finding it.
The tests described will be minimal tests: that is, what is the lowest
permissible level of evidence to sustain an equal protection violation in
98
a given factual context? It is at this level that decisions are hardest.'
The examples given are only examples, and are not intended to be
exhaustive. The variety of factual contexts is too great to enumerate
within the limits of this Note. The cases presented are meant to be
illustrative of approaches that courts have used to find discriminatory
intent.
B.

Purpose Test

In Diaz v. San Jose Unified School District,199 the Ninth Circuit
reaffirmed 2°° its "purpose" test. The court found no constitutional
violation because there was insufficient evidence that the school board
was "practicing a purposeful policy of racial separation in the school
195. E.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977).
196. 426 U.S. at 253.
197. 413 U.S. at 208.
198. The cases in which segregative purpose is obvious present few problems. See,
e.g., note 156 supra. As Justice Powell noted in Arlington Heights, where there is an
abundance of evidence of segregative intent, "[t]he evidentiary inquiry is then relatively
easy." 429 U.S. at 266. But as Justice Powell further suggested, "such cases are rare."
Id. Far more often the evidence of intent is limited and the inquiry more difficult as a
consequence.
199. 412 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
200. The decision in Diaz followed from two previous Ninth Circuit decisions in
which the "purpose" standard of segregative intent had been adopted: Johnson v. San
Francisco Unified School Dist., 500 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1974), and Soria v. Oxnard School
Dist., 488 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1973).
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system." 20 ' The facts indicated that school authorities were aware of
segregation between Anglo and Spanish-surnamed school children.
The school district had perpetuated the existing ethnic division by site
selection of new buildings and adherence to a neighborhood school
policy in a racially segregated community. After finding the school
system had consistently adhered to a neighborhood school policy, the
court held that the school system had no affirmative duty to improve
racial balance unless it had violated the Constitution by purposely
20 2
causing the imbalance.
The Diaz court indicated that the "Ninth Circuit's post-Keyes
decisions [had] adopted the 'purpose' rather than the 'foreseeable'
standard of unconstitutional segregation. "203 From this it can be inferred that the evidence of segregative intent must be more explicit
than that required for the general tort standard. 204 The court refused to
infer discriminatory purpose from failure to follow integrative policies
or from board decisions that tended to maintain the segregated status
205
quo.
Since the court did not find the requisite intent, despite a pattern of
decisions made with the obvious result of maintaining segregation, it is
difficult to imagine a situation where the necessary intent would be
found, other than where segregative intent is express. Use of the
Arlington Heights evidentiary sources, stressing official action evincing clear discriminatory purpose, may not be too helpful to determine
intent when the district court emphasizes the consistency of the school
authorities' adherence to the neighborhood school policy. 2°6 It should
be noted that the Diaz court, rejecting an objective test of foreseeability, opted instead for a standard focusing on subjective motivation.
201.
202.
203.
204.

412 F. Supp. at 330.
Id.
Id. at 329.
For a discussion of the forseeability test and pattern test, see notes 210-38 infra

and accompanying text. It would appear that to date, only the Ninth Circuit has adopted
a purpose test for segregative intent. But see Note, supra note 161, at 322.
205. The Diaz court justified the school board's maintenance of the status quo as
follows:
The Court cannot, however, say that in applying the neighborhood school
policy and rebuilding the schools within the existing area the board violated the
Constitution: to hold that such action constitutes segregative conduct would be

to cast on the school board an affirmative duty to improve ethnic balance; this
the Ninth Circuit has refused to do.
412 F. Supp. at 310.
206. Challenge to a neighborhood school policy on grounds of racial discrimination

becomes even more difficult in light of the numerous arguments which support neighborhood schools. As the Diaz majority points out, time and safety considerations, plus
increased parental involvement in the educational process, all argue in favor of neighborhood school policies. Id. at 335.
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Thus, the purpose test poses serious practical and evidentiary problems. As one commentator has pointed out, since
individual decision-makers will rarely admit improper motivation, a finding of subjective intent generally must be inferred
from circumstantial evidence. . . . [B]ehind any act may lie
a number of subjective motivations. Thus, judges must rely
on their knowledge of human nature in deciding whether
particular facts are indicative of segregative intent.20 1
As a consequence, decisions among the courts are likely to be inconsistent and unpredictable. Although the Diaz court refused to infer a
discriminatory purpose from the school board's failure to follow integrative policies, other courts have found the same evidence sufficient
to support a finding of segregative intent. 20 8 Furthermore, even where
the evidence of motivation is more than circumstantial, the task of
determining the actual intent of an entire school board is all but
impossible. As one court has argued, there is unfairness in "ascribing
collective will to articulate remarks of particular bigots . . .,,20
C.

ForeseeabilityTest

Most courts of appeals and the Supreme Court have used or
approved an objective standard to find intent in school segregation
cases. As noted earlier in discussing Keyes and Milliken,210 the lower
courts inferred intent by applying the familiar tort standard of foreseeability, and the Supreme Court approved. As Justice Stevens indicated,
concurring in Davis, requisite intent is found in the formulation that
"normally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his deeds." 21 1 This standard was not mentioned, however,
in the majority opinion in Davis or in Arlington Heights, but, again, it
must be noted that neither of these cases was a school segregation case.
Perhaps taking their cue from the Supreme Court when it decided
Keyes and Milliken, many circuits have inferred segregative intent
from the foreseeability of the effect of the school authorities' actions.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals described the intent "which
triggers a finding of unconstitutionality not [as] an intent to harm black
students, but simply an intent to bring about or maintain segregated
schools." 21 2 To find the requisite intent on the part of school officials,
207. Note, supra note 161, at 325.
208. Morgan v.-Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 585 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied 421 U.S. 963

(1975); Amos v. Board of School Directors, 408 F. Supp. 765, 819 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
209. Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975).
210. See notes 36-60 supra and accompanying text.
211. 426 U.S. at 253.
212. United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530, 535 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975), remand, 418 F. Supp. 22 (D. Neb. 1976), aff'd, 541 F.2d 708
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the Eighth Circuit in UnitedStates v. School Districtof Omaha 213 used
a presumption of segregative intent which "arises once it is established
that school authorities have engaged in acts or omissions, the natural,
probable and foreseeable consequence of which is to bring about or
maintain segregation." 2 14 The court of appeals found that the school
officials' evidence was not sufficient to overcome the court's presumption of intent. This intent was inferred from the school authorities'
policies and actions in regard to faculty assignment, student transfers,
optional attendance zones, school construction, and the deterioration
of a particular school.21 5 In a per curiam decision, two months after the
Supreme Court decided Davis, the court again reviewed the Omaha
holding and "found nothing [in the Davis opinion] that would cause us
to revise our earlier opinion. '"216 In other words, the Omaha court
found nothing in Davis to indicate that the foreseeability standard was
unacceptable.
In Hart v. Community School Board of Education,217 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals used a standard identical to that of the Eighth
Circuit. "Unless the Supreme Court speaks to the contrary, we believe
that a finding of de jure segregation may be based on actions taken,
coupled with omissions made by governmental authorities which have
the natural and foreseeable consequence of causing educational segregation." 2 18 The Hart court adopted the objective standard, rather than
a more specific intent standard because "[tlo say that the foreseeable
must be shown to have been actually foreseen would invite a standard
almost impossible of proof save by admissions." 2' 19 This goes to the
point mentioned before in regard to the "purpose" standard of intent,
that subjective motivation is very difficult to discover and prove.
A second reason given in Hartfor not requiring a finding of actual
intent relates to the purpose of the litigation in school (and other)
discrimination cases: "[tihe Fourteenth Amendment is not meant to
assess blame but to prevent injustice.' ,220 The focus of the inquiry is
(8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), vacated and remandedper curiam, 45 U.S.L.W. 3849, 3850
(U.S. June 29, 1977).
213. 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1975). For a detailed discussion of Omaha, see Case Note,
Second CircuitReview, 1974-75 Term, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 961, 976-80 (1976).
214. 521 F.2d at 535-36.
215. Id. at 537.
216. 541 F.2d at 709.
217. Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975). For a
detailed discussion of Hart, see Note, Foreseeable RacialSegregation-A Presumption
41-43 supra and accompanying text.
218. 512 F.2d at 50.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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not to discover and punish violators, but to determine whether people
have been denied equal protection of the law. If they have, then their
right to equal protection must be enforced. Under this rationale a more
specific intent requirement appears to work at cross purposes with a
meaningful guarantee of constitutional rights.
Using the Hart standard, a district court found unconstitutional
segregation in the public schools and housing of Buffalo. In Arthur v.
Nyquist,2 the court found the requisite intent in a substantial portion
of the school district, and then shifted the burden to the school
authorities to prove that their other actions were not performed with the
same discriminatory intent. This is the same burden shift used in
Keyes. 222 Defendants then had to prove "that segregative intent was
223
not among the factors that motivated their actions."
The Sixth Circuit has also employed the foreseeability test to infer
intent to discriminate. Asked to review whether a previous adjudication of segregation in Cincinnati schools 224 was sufficient to prevent a
suit ten years later, the court of appeals reviewed its decisions about
intent after Keyes. 225 The test used was again the tort test of foreseeability.226
[A] court may infer intent, which is a subjective fact not
easily proven, from evidence of racial imbalance accompanied by acts or omissions of a school board, the natural and
probable result of which is to produce or perpetuate a segregated school system. 22 '
In Oliver v. Michigan State Board of Education,228 the Sixth
Circuit again employed the foreseeability test and presumption of
segregative intent in order to find that school authorities had violated
the students' rights to equal protection. 229 The district court outlined
221. 415 F. Supp. 904 (W.D.N.Y. 1976).
222. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
223. 415 F. Supp. at 913.
224. Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 419 F.2d 1387 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 962 (1971).
225. Bronson v. Board of Educ., 525 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1975).
226. The reliance of the Deal and Bronson courts on an objective test of foreseeability has been disputed on the grounds that it was a subjective purpose test which in fact
was adopted. See Note, supra note 161, at 322 n.29.
227. 525 F.2d at 348.
228. 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974).
229. Only three days prior to the Oliver decision, in Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508
F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974), the court affirmed a district court school decision which did not
apply the foreseeability standard. The district court had found that, for all the alleged
incidents, the segregation either was not caused by the board or was not intentional.
Though a standard of intent was not clearly defined, some have interpreted Higgins to
apply a subjective purpose test. See Note, supra note 161, at 322 n.29. The circumstances surrounding Higgins and Oliver may help to explain the inconsistent results.
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the factual showing establishing de jure segregation, including the
requisite intent.
It is established that where an appropriate factual showing
has been made, including a showing that an existing segregated situation is to a significant extent the natural,probable, and actual result of the actions and inactions of the state
and local agencies, the plaintiffs have laid an evidentiary
foundation for the conclusion that the results, segregated
schools, were intended to be reached by these authorities."'
In summary, a number of courts have adopted a foreseeability test
focusing upon the objective consequences of actions of school officials. This focus allows a court to avoid some of the evidentiary
problems of a "purpose" test, where the party supposedly harboring
the intent is often ill-defined and the evidence of subjective motivation
usually unclear. 3 1 Furthermore, the foreseeability test offers a relatively clear-cut standard, familiar to courts and litigators. The test has
been criticized, however, on the grounds that its sweep is too broad.
The failure of a school board to adopt policies which might alleviate
racial imbalance necessarily perpetuates existing imbalance. Such a
result is clearly foreseeable, and thus application of the standard may
impose upon the school board an affirmative obligation to promote
2 32
integration.
D.

Pattern or Totality of the Facts Test

In Armstrong v. Brennan,233 a case decided after Davis,234 the
Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court's finding of discriminatory
purpose based on the total pattern of school authorities' actions,
although no individual action unmistakenly signalled discriminatory
intent. Quoting the language of Davis, the appellate court explained:
Purpose may of course be inferred from "the totality of the
relevant facts," which may include discriminatory impact
...
. As Mr. Justice Stevens said in his concurring opinion
First, in Higgins, the school system had initiated a voluntary desegregation program
which the court did not want to discourage. 508 F.2d at 789. Second, different court
personnel were involved in the two decisions. In Higgins, Circuit Judge Miller was
joined by Judges Lively and Weick. In Oliver, Circuit Judge Celebrezze wrote an opinion
in which Judge Peck joined; Judge Weick dissented. The Sixth Circuit recently affirmed
its acceptance of the foreseeability standard citing Oliver for support. NAACP v.
Lansing, No. 76-1267 (6th Cir. July 26, 1977).
230. 368 F. Supp. 143, 162, quoted in 508 F.2d at 181 (emphasis added).
231. See notes 207-09 supra and accompanying text.
232. For further authority in regard to this argument, see note 137 supra.
233. 539 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded per curiam, 45 U.S.L.W.
3849, 3850 (U.S. June 29, 1977).
234. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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in that case, "Frequently the most probative evidence of
intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened
rather than evidence
describing the subjective state of mind
2 35
of the actor."
The court then reviewed the evidence from which the district court
inferred intent, and affirmed.23 6 The district court, after reviewing the
evidence, had found it "hard to believe that out of all the decisions
made by school authorities under varying conditions over a twentyyear period, mere chance resulted in there being almost no decision
that resulted in the furthering of integration.- 237 The district court
found a conscious and systematic program of segregation affecting the
whole public school system. The court of appeals, upholding the
district court's standard for intent, affirmed its finding of "a pattern
clear enough to give rise to a permissible inference of segregative
intent.'" 238
E. Various Levels of Intent Analysis Within a Single Case
The preceding analysis gives an overview of the tests various
courts have used for finding intent in school segregation cases. This
analysis may be misleading, however, if it conveys the impression that
courts use only one standard of intent in a particular case, and that
evidence of intent within a case lends itself to no more than a single
level of intent analysis. The more common fact situation is where the
court must deal with evidence of innumerable school board decisions
and actions, each of which-separately and in combination-may
provide evidence for different modes of intent analysis. The evidence
of intent may be obvious, on the face of a statute, or deeply submerged, allowing school authorities to rebut any presumptions of
intent. More likely, the evidence of intent will vary between these
extremes.
For instance, in Reed v. Rhodes,239 a district court case decided
after Davis, the court applied different levels of intent analysis to the
various actions of the school authorities in the Cleveland public
schools. In Reed, the simplest analysis inferred intent from the effect
of school board actions.2' This was the foreseeability test combined
235. 539 F.2d at 634.
236. It is interesting to note that Circuit Judge Tone wrote the opinion supporting the
finding of intent in Armstrong; he was the dissenting judge who could not find the
requisite intent in Buckley, 541 F.2d at 1224.
237. 408 F. Supp. 765, 819 (E.D. Wis. 1976), quoted in 539 F.2d at 634.
238. 539 F.2d at 637.
239. 422 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
240. Id. at 713-15. In applying this test, the Reed court interpreted Davis to be
consistent with Keyes and subsequent lower court decisions in its acceptance of a
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with the presumption of intent as described in Oliver,241 Hart,242 and
Omaha .243 The Reed court indicated, however, that inference of intent
from effect was unnecessary where many incidents "can be rationally
attributed only to a deliberate and conscious desire to create or perpetuate a segregated condition. "24 This analysis was used to find the
intent behind the siting of certain school construction and intact busing, where complete classes of black students were bused intact from
one school to another and maintained intact at the predominately white
receiving school.
The court used a somewhat different test to examine school officials' actions in other fact situations. This test was: "how, under the
circumstances at a given time, would a school board fairly and realistically employ its available classroom space without any intent to
discriminate? ' 245 Divergence from this standard would imply discriminatory intent. Thus, discriminatory intent was inferred from
school decisions relating to attendance zones, additions to buildings,
new construction, and feeder patterns.
Relay classes and intact busing were a facet of a "consistent and
deliberate policy of racial isolation." '2 4 6 The finding of intent with
regard to these policies suggested again the importance of a consistent
pattern of behavior, rather than occasional, isolated instances. As the
court suggested, quoting from Oliver (another Sixth Circuit case),
"the question is whether a purposeful pattern of segregation has
manifested itself over time, despite the fact that individual official
actions, considered alone, may not have been taken for segregative
purposes and may not have been in themselves constitutionally in-

valid. "247
Another level of intent analysis was applied where the school board
admitted they had a policy of assigning black principals to black
schools and white principals to white schools. Citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,248 the Reed court considered
this per se unconstitutional, indicating that "the ability to identify a
foreseeability standard for the finding of segregative intent. "It should be noted, however, that the decision in. . . [Davis] is in no way a departure from the existing state of
the law, particularly with regard to the inferring of intent from effect." Id. at 8.
241. 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974).
242. 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975).
243. 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1974).
244. 422 F. Supp. at 715.
245. Id. at 717.
246. Id. at 784.
247. 508 F.2d at 182-83 (emphasis added).
248. 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971).
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'white' or 'black' school merely by reference to the racial composition
of its faculty and administration constitutes a prima facie violation of
the equal protection clause." '24 9 The court also dismissed the role
model rationale for the racial assignment as inadequate to combat the
inference of segregative intent.
The above are illustrative of a court's findings-in a single caseof the discriminatory intent which undergirds an equal protection
violation. Various levels of intent analysis were applied to a variety of
different school board actions, decisions-, and practices, over a period
of time, in one school system. The combinations of fact patterns vary
with each case; the inferences of intent vary just as much. Nevertheless, certain standard tests seem to underlie the various courts' determinations.
V.

A.

CONCLUSIONS

Minimal Levels of Intent Required for
Equal Protection Violations

A sampling of intent tests in several federal circuits indicates that a
variety of tests are being applied to a multiplicity of fact patterns.
There is no indication from the Supreme Court that any one of these
tests does not meet the minimal level of intent required for finding a
constitutional violation. Recent opinions of the Supreme Court regarding segregative intent have dealt with zoning and employment discrimination, fact situations not truly analogous to the circumstances of
school segregation. Therefore, the analyses used are not necessarily the
only ones applicable to school segregation cases.
For example, Arlington Heights"0 focused on the constitutionality
of one particular village decision, the decision to deny the request for
rezoning. This single decision was evaluated in its historical context,
in part to assess whether it was part of a pattern indicating discriminatory intent. Nevertheless, the alleged violation was circumscribed in
time and place, and the evidentiary sources the court found useful in
assessing intent were, likewise, applicable to this one-time situation.
This is not to say that the inquiries suggested in Arlington Heights
cannot be used in other factual contexts; they were derived from cases
culled from various areas of discrimination law. But, as the case itself
indicated, the evidentiary sources suggested and used in Arlington
249. 422 F. Supp. at 788.
250. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
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Heights were not exhaustive, and others may be used to find, or not
find, discriminatory intent in other cases.
The number and complexity of the actions and facts in evidence,
and the long periods of time over which those actions are taken, make
school segregation cases more difficult to analyze in terms of intent.
To evaluate the myriad evidentiary factors, the court will often use
several levels of intent analysis within a single case. Furthermore, a
finding of segregative intent in a substantial portion of the system
creates a presumption of similar intent throughout the district. This
presumption may be rebutted only by a showing of absolute neutrality
by the state. With this kind of burden shift, and with the many different
levels of intent analysis generally shown in any one case, it is difficult
to decide what minimal tests of intent will lead to a finding of a school
segregation violation. Nevertheless, it is important that the intent
necessary to find a violation be found at its minimum level. If a test
above this minimum level is used, the effect may be to foreclose equal
protection guarantees from innumerable minority students.
If a court uses a test more rigorous than is necessary to decide
whether public school authorities have abridged the rights of minority
students, the court may be preventing those students from vindicating
their constitutional rights to equal protection under the law. On the
other hand, any standards employed must be adequate to prove the
intent required to establish the violation. If the test does not determine intent, whole school systems may be altered to provide a remedy
for a constitutional violation that does not exist. It now appears to be
unquestionable that numerical segregation in schools, and segregative
action or inaction, do not violate the Constitution unless some kind of
discriminatory intent is also present.
A summary review of the tests being used, and a comparison with
Supreme Court opinions, may help clarify the constitutional requirements pertaining to intent in school segregation cases. Throughout the
analysis it should be kept in mind that objective tests of intent are
important because intent is difficult to define without analytical
guidelines. As Judge Battisti said in Reed:
[Intent] is an amorphous term than can mean different things
in different factual and legal contexts. Because intent is such
a subjective element, existing in pure form only in the minds
of individual people, courts have found it necessary to discern evidence of intent through an analysis of its objective
manifestations. This is admittedly an artificial mechanism,
but one not unknown to other areas of the law, and without
which courts would be hard put to protect individual rights.25 '
251. 422 F. Supp. at 712-13 (footnotes omitted).
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The tort test, which assumes that a person intends the foreseeable
effects of his actions, appears to be acceptable to the Supreme Court,
as evidenced by its implicit approval in Keyes and Milliken 2 This
test has been used in school segregation cases by a number of circuits,
and has the advantage of being familiar because of its use in a wide
variety of legal contexts. Neither the-majority opinion in Davis, nor
the Arlington Heights case, mentioned the foreseeability test as an
appropriate guidepost for establishing intent. But at least three justices
have accepted the tort standard in the recent intent cases: Justice
Stevens in his concurring opinion in Davis specifically indicated his
acceptance of the foreseeability test as an appropriate standard, 253 and
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissenting from the summary disposition in Austin indicated their agreement with the foreseeability standards used by the lower court. 254 Counter-balancing this, however, is
the concurrence in Austin where Justice Powell, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, raised doubts about the test, or at
least raised doubts about the way the foreseeability test was applied in
that particular context. 255 The probable acceptability of the foreseeability test relates to the fact that it is a well-established legal standard with
broad applicability. The propriety of this test relates to the primary
purpose of equal protection litigation, which is not to assess blame, but
to guarantee constitutional rights.
The test which infers intent from the pattern or the totality of the
facts seems equally appropriate in light of the purpose of trying to
establish the constitutional violation. Again, the focus is not on the
specific intent of the individual actors but on the general intent that
manifests itself over time. The pattern test may be used as an alternative to or as a supplement to the foreseeability test depending upon the
circumstances, and is applicable to facts which involve a series of
actions occurring over a period of time. The pattern test may be
inferred from language in Arlington Heights. The Court talked about
"a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, [which]
emerges from the effect of the state action even when the governing
legislation appears neutral on its face."256 The pattern test in Armstrong v. Brennan"s7 is similar to the "clear pattern" test suggested in
252. See notes 47, 55 supra and accompanying text.
253. 426 U.S. at 253. See notes 106-07 supra and accompanying text.
254. 429 U.S. at 990. For a discussion of the foreseeability standard as applied by the
lower court in Austin, see notes 110-38 supra and accompanying text.
255. 429 U.S. at 991. See notes 116-20 supra and accompanying text.
256. 429 U.S. at 266.
257. 539 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded per curiam, 45 U.S.L.W.
3849, 3850 (U.S. June 29, 1977). See notes 233-38 supra and accompanying text.
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Arlington Heights in that it looks at the effects of a series of actions.
The inference created by the pattern may be rebuttable, but it will at
least prove a prima facie case of segregative intent.
The purpose test of the Ninth Circuit25 8 appears to require a higher
level of intent than may be mandated by the Supreme Court. The court
appears to be looking for evidence of the subjective intent of those
inVolved in the decision-making process. If this test requires more than
the minimum intent necessary to find an equal protection violation, it
may be denying minorities their rights to redress unconstitutional
segregative actions. Thus, the purpose test may be constitutionally
defective.
B.

Effect of the Recent Supreme Court Decisions
on School SegregationLaw
The fundamental import of the four recent Supreme Court decisions discussed above is that the mere fact of discriminatory impact is
not. sufficient to show an equal protection violation. An essential
element of the constitutional violation is segregative intent.
In school segregation cases, however, almost all courts after Keyes
in 1973 had assumed that discriminatory intent was a requisite element
of the violation and had found intent when they found a violation. The
Buckley case 9 is an exception to this general assertion, and the
Supreme Court's remand of the case for further consideration in light
of Davis and Arlington Heights seems appropriate. 26° The Court's
explicit requirement of intent did little to change the basis upon which
most school segregation cases were in fact litigated.
However, the recent actions of the Supreme Court have done little
to clarify or amplify the legal standards for ascertaining whether or not
the requisite, segregative intent is present in a particular school case. In
fact, in several lower court cases decided since Davis, there is no
indication that Davis had any impact on the determination of discriminatory intent. The two full Supreme Court opinions related to
employment and zoning discrimination, and the tests used by the Court
were not totally applicable to school cases. Both Davis and Arlington
Heights suggested possible approaches for finding intent, but did not
preclude the use of evidentiary sources other than those described. The
summary dispositions of the two school cases, Austin and Buckley,
258. See notes 199-209 supra and accompanying text.
259. 541 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1976). See notes 177-79 supra and accompanying text.
260. It seems particularly appropriate since the Buckley court had relied on Wright,

and the Davis and Arlington Heights decisions considerably narrowed the applicability
of Wright. See text accompanying notes 89-92 supra.
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shed little light on how to find intent from the factual pattern in school
cases.
The two full opinions did indicate that the minimum level of
discriminatory intent must be evident from more than just discriminatory impact, but this may be demonstrated by considerably less than
overt and express segregative purpose. Thus, the outer limits of the
minimum requirement of intent are set. The remands of the school
cases indicate that the lower courts may be primarily responsible for
further refining the evidentiary tests for finding intent. This is what the
lower courts have been doing since the initial perimeters were set in
Keyes. There has been no clear indication from the Supreme Court that
the tests now used do not properly delineate at least the threshold intent
necessary for a constitutional violation.
While this Note suggests that the Supreme Court has not changed
the legal standard that may be used by the lower courts, there may still
be collateral effects on school segregation cases. The most obvious
effect on the two cases remanded is additional delay in bringing these
cases to a final conclusion. The two cases have dragged on now for
almost a decade, and the remands promise more months of confusion
and delay for the communities involved.2 6'
Secondly, since neither of the two full Supreme Court opinions
reviewed a trial court determination of intent, the remand of the school
cases did not disapprove of the continued use of existing standards of
intent. This situation presents problems, since no standard of segregative intent has gained uniform application among the circuits, and no
clear standard has been articulated by the Supreme Court.
The net effect may be that, in their uncertainty over the proper
standard to apply, the lower courts will use tests more rigorous than
actually necessary to find the intent which triggers the finding of a
constitutional violation (where segregative acts and effects are already
present). If, as has been suggested, the Ninth Circuit purpose test is
more demanding than necessary, then its application by any of the
circuits will fail to remedy some situations in which a constitutional
violation is present. The fact that there is confusion about acceptable
standards may also cause lower courts to decide conservatively, using
a more rigorous standard to avoid possible reversal. As one judge
261. Of course, dealing with the cases in this way is totally valid if it accomplishes
something. But in these cases it is possible to argue that the courts' findings need only be
re-worded to show the process of reasoning from the facts to the inference of intent, in
order to meet the mandate of the Supreme Court. Any appellate court decision may then
be taken once again to the Supreme Court for review of the adequacy of the intent
standards used. This involves even more delay and uncertainty.
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reported, "he tends to write narrower opinions these days because of
the 'feeling that the Supreme Court will cut us down.' "262
In sum, recent decisions have had minimal effect on the standards
that courts are required to use to find equal protection violations.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court opinions may have considerable
impact on the legal standards that courts will in fact use for finding
discriminatory intent, in order to avoid delay and possible reversal. If
the standards the courts use to find segregative intent are higher than
constitutionally required, it will have the effect of preventing many
minority students from receiving equal protection under the law, as
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. Whether
this effect is what the majority of the Supreme Court intended, we can
only infer. Can we infer that in this situation the Supreme Court
intended the natural, probable, and foreseeable consequences of its
actions?
LOUISE E. McKNNEY
262. Falk, Judicial Legacy: Nixon and Ford Appointees Soften Activist Role Appellate Court Played in Rights Cases in South, Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1977, at 34, col. 2.

